21 CFR Part 11, control by control
For pharmaceutical, biotech, medical device, and clinical research teams using electronic records and signatures under FDA jurisdiction. This page maps Abundera Sign to each Part 11 control so your QA and validation teams can review the technical basis directly.
§11.10Closed system controls
Procedures and controls for closed systems holding electronic records.
- Validated computerized system, Cloudflare Pages on a defined runtime with reproducible deploys
- Ability to discern invalid or altered records, every artifact is SHA-256 hashed and recorded in the audit trail
- System access limited to authorized individuals, JWT plus product-scoped API key with KV-cached revocation
- Secure, computer-generated, time-stamped audit trails recording the date and time of operator entries and actions that create, modify, or delete electronic records (see §11.10(e))
- Operational system checks to enforce permitted sequencing of steps and events, signing order enforcement and gate-by-gate evidence capture
- Authority checks ensure only authorized individuals can use the system, electronically sign a record, access the operation or computer system input or output device, alter a record, or perform the operation at hand
§11.10(e)Audit trail
Secure, computer-generated, time-stamped audit trail.
- Every audit entry is hashed with SHA-256 and includes the previous entry's hash, the chain breaks if any prior entry is modified
- Timestamps are recorded in UTC with millisecond precision on the system clock and counter-signed by RFC 3161 trusted timestamp authorities (DigiCert primary, Sectigo secondary)
- Audit trail captures: envelope creation, signer view, access code entry, OTP send and verify, field changes, signature submission, decline, delegation, clause flagging, seal, and download
- Audit records are retained for the full envelope retention period (3 to 99 years) in WORM (Write Once Read Many) storage
- Audit trail is available for FDA inspection through the public verify API and a downloadable JSON export
§11.30Open system controls
Additional controls when records flow over an open network.
- TLS 1.3 in transit, terminated at Cloudflare edge with HSTS preload
- Document content stored in encrypted R2 buckets at rest
- PAdES-LTA digital signature embeds the document hash inside the cryptographic signature, so any byte change invalidates the signature
- HMAC-signed webhook callbacks to customer endpoints
- Content Security Policy restricts script sources, the signing surface uses strict same-origin script policy
§11.50Signature manifestation
Signed records must clearly display the printed name, date and time of signing, and meaning of the signature.
- Printed signer name on every signature block, captured from the verified profile, not user-typed at signing time
- Signing date and time in UTC with millisecond precision, anchored to the RFC 3161 timestamp token
- Meaning of signature, sender pre-assignable per signer via the
signature_meaningfield on envelope create (Approved by, Reviewed by, Authored by, Acknowledged by, Witnessed by, or a custom 80-character string). Captured at sign time in the immutable hash-chained audit trail, rendered on the Certificate of Completion, and attested in the cryptographic PAdES signature Reason field that covers the whole document. Per-signature-block rendering on the document face is on the near-term roadmap - Signature block also shows IP address, user agent, geolocation (if captured), and signature evidence hash for cross-reference with the audit trail
- Certificate of Completion appended to every signed PDF aggregates all of the above per signer plus the hash chain head
§11.70Signature/record linking
Signatures must be linked to records so they cannot be excised, copied, or transferred.
- PAdES-LTA embeds the cryptographic signature inside the PDF, the signature covers the entire byte range of the document
- AATL-certified signing certificate, issued to Abundera, Inc., backed by an RSA-3072 key in Azure Key Vault HSM (FIPS 140-2 Level 3)
- Removing the signed PDF from its evidence package does not weaken admissibility, the public verify endpoint resolves the document hash to the sealed evidence record
- Long Term Validation (LTV) information embedded so the signature remains verifiable after the signing certificate expires
§11.100Unique signatures
Each electronic signature shall be unique to one individual and shall not be reused by, or reassigned to, anyone else.
- Signature identity tied to the signer's verified email address and, for high-assurance flows, a passkey (WebAuthn) bound to the signer's authenticator
- Signing tokens are 256-bit CSPRNG, stored as SHA-256 hashes, single-use, and rotated to fresh tokens for any re-send
- Delegation creates a new signer record with a fresh signing token and a delegation audit event linking it to the original
- Signer profiles store verified attributes (verified email, optional government ID, optional passkey credential) per individual
§11.200Non-biometric signature components
Non-biometric electronic signatures must use at least two distinct identification components.
- Component one, signing token delivered to the signer's verified email address
- Component two, SMS one-time passcode to the signer's verified phone number (or passkey biometric for Professional plus tier)
- OTP rate limited to 3 sends per signer, 60 second cooldown, 3 verification attempts per code
- For continuous-session signing, signer must re-authenticate after any session break before completing the signing event
§11.300Identification codes / passwords
Controls to ensure the security and integrity of identification codes and passwords.
- Identity is centralized at abundera.ai (the parent product), users do not maintain separate credentials for Abundera Sign
- Uniqueness of code and password combination enforced at the central identity hub
- Periodic re-validation through passkey or password rotation, configurable per organization
- Account lockout after failed attempts, alerting to security operations on anomalous activity
- Lost or compromised tokens can be revoked through the dashboard or by API call, revocation is reflected immediately in the KV cache
What is on the roadmap
Signer-selected meaning of signature at signing time (in addition to today's sender-assigned meaning), a Part 11 envelope mode that forces 2FA plus reason-for-change capture plus meaning selection on every signing event, and a published validation pack (IQ/OQ/PQ templates) to accelerate customer system validation. Email compliance@abundera.ai if your QA team needs a target date.
Frequently asked questions
Is Abundera Sign 21 CFR Part 11 compliant?
Part 11 compliance is a property of how a regulated entity uses the system, not the software alone. Abundera Sign provides the technical controls Part 11 requires. The regulated entity is responsible for system validation in its environment, SOPs, and operating under a quality management system.
What evidence does Abundera Sign produce for an FDA audit?
Every signed envelope produces a sealed evidence package containing the signed PDF (with embedded PAdES-LTA signature and RFC 3161 timestamp), Certificate of Completion, hash-chained audit trail, signature data per signer, and external anchors. The package is stored in WORM buckets with retention locks of 3 to 99 years depending on plan.
Does Abundera Sign require system validation (IQ/OQ/PQ)?
The regulated entity is responsible for validation. Abundera Sign provides the technical evidence pack on request to customers under active QMS programs: OpenAPI spec, immutable audit log, RFC 3161 tokens, and AATL-certified signing keys backed by an HSM.
How is signature meaning captured?
Sender pre-assigns the meaning per signer at envelope create time (signature_meaning field). It is captured in the hash-chained audit trail at sign time, rendered on the Certificate of Completion appended to every signed PDF, and attested in the cryptographic PAdES Reason field that covers the whole document. Per-signature-block rendering on the document face and signer-selected meaning at signing time are on the near-term roadmap.
Is the audit trail tamper-evident?
Yes. Each entry hash includes the previous hash. The chain is anchored to GitHub at intervals and counter-signed by RFC 3161 timestamp authorities, so the chain head is fixed at a public point in time and cannot be back-dated.
Need a signed copy of the technical evidence pack, an MSA with FDA-applicable terms, or a quote for a Part 11 enterprise deployment? Email compliance@abundera.ai or see the Trust Center for the full security and privacy posture.